This paper will examine the implications of an extended “field theory of information,” suggested by Wolfhart Pannenberg, specifically in the Christian understanding of creation. The paper argues that the Holy Spirit created the world as field, a concept from physics, and the creation is directed by the logos utilizing information. Taking into account more recent developments of information theory, the essay further suggests that present creation has a causal impact upon the information utilized in creation. In order to adequately address (...) Pannenberg's hypothesis that the logos utilizes information at creation the essay will also include an introductory examination of Pannenberg's Christology which shifts from a strict “from below” Christology, to a more open “third way” of doing Christology beyond “above” and “below.” The essay concludes with a brief section relating the implications of an extended “field theory of information” to creative inspiration, as well as parallels with human inspiration. (shrink)

A considerable literature exists regard-ing the moral obligation to keep one's promises. Several authors have focused on the exceptional circumstances which may or should excuse this moral duty. Less frequently discussed is the question of how this general moral obligation and its possible exceptions play out in the context of negotiable written promises to pay money, i.e., so-called "commercial paper."This paper focuses on the application of the legal rules governing commercial paper, and on the ethical implications involved in the application (...) of those rules. More specifically, it asks whether the assertion of the technical doctrine known as "holder in due course," and the denial of that status in some cases, promotes ethical behavior in the marketplace. By examining the circumstances of one case, involving a substantial investment and a large bank, I hope to shed some light on how the legal and ethical rules do in fact "intersect.". (shrink)

Lawyers and the legal system have been much criticized in recent years. Despite popular perceptions, the legal system contains numerous mechanisms and rules designed to ensure fair results. This paper shows how the legal system tries to implement, in commercial transactions, the ethical principles of truthfulness and fairness. The Anglo-American development of Equity Courts is reviewed briefly. Several examples of the Law's enforcement of ethical principles are presented, in four different legal areas: Contracts, Securities, Goods, and Real Estate. The intent (...) here is to present an overview of the problem, with area-specific illustrations, rather than a comprehenisve examination of the cases in just one area. (shrink)

A considerable literature exists regarding the moral obligation to keep one's promises. Several authors have focused on the exceptional circumstances which may or should excuse this moral duty. Less frequently discussed is the question of how this general moral obligation and its possible exceptions play out in the context of negotiable written promises to pay money, i.e., so-called "commercial paper." This paper focuses on the application of the legal rules governing commercial paper, and on the ethical implications involved in the (...) application of those rules. More specifically, it asks whether the assertion of the technical doctrine known as "holder in due course," and the denial of that status in some cases, promotes ethical behavior in the marketplace. By examining the circumstances of one case, involving a substantial investment and a large bank, I hope to shed some light on how the legal and ethical rules do in fact "intersect.". (shrink)

White on White/Black on Black is a unique contribution to the philosophy of race. The text explores how 14 philosophers, 7 white and 7 black, philosophically understand the dynamics of the process of racialization.

This is a much-needed reissue of the standard English translation of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, originally published in 1970. The Philosophy of Nature is the second part of Hegel's Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, all of which is now available in English from OUP (Part I being his Logic, Part III being his Philosophy of Mind). Hegel's aim in this work is to interpret the varied phenomena of Nature from the standpoint of a dialectical logic. Those who still think of (...) Hegel as a merely a priori philosopher will here find abundant evidence that he was keenly interested in and very well informed about empirical science. The Philosophy of Nature is integral to his philosophical system and deserves the most serious attention. Students and scholars of Hegel and the history of European philosophy will welcome the availability of this important text, which also includes a translation of Hegel's Zusatze or lecture notes. (shrink)

Volume II of two readers containing essential important works on constitutional liberty and the foundations of modern western political theory. This second volume contains works from King George II through Hitler and Stalin.

Part I: The Life of Cognitive Science:. William Bechtel, Adele Abrahamsen, and George Graham. Part II: Areas of Study in Cognitive Science:. 1. Analogy: Dedre Gentner. 2. Animal Cognition: Herbert L. Roitblat. 3. Attention: A.H.C. Van Der Heijden. 4. Brain Mapping: Jennifer Mundale. 5. Cognitive Anthropology: Charles W. Nuckolls. 6. Cognitive and Linguistic Development: Adele Abrahamsen. 7. Conceptual Change: Nancy J. Nersessian. 8. Conceptual Organization: Douglas Medin and Sandra R. Waxman. 9. Consciousness: Owen Flanagan. 10. Decision Making: J. Frank (...) Yates and Paul A. Estin. 11. Emotions: Paul E. Griffiths. 12. Imagery and Spatial Representation: Rita E. Anderson. 13. Language Evolution and Neuromechanisms: Terrence W. Deacon. 14. Language Processing: Kathryn Bock and Susan M. Garnsey. 15. Linguistics Theory: D. Terence Langendoen. 16. Machine Learning: Paul Thagard. 17. Memory: Henry L. Roediger III and Lyn M. Goff. 18. Perception: Cees Van Leeuwen. 19. Perception: Color: Austen Clark. 20. Problem Solving: Kevin Dunbar. 21. Reasoning: Lance J. Rips. 22. Social Cognition: Alan J. Lambert and Alison L. Chasteen. 23. Unconscious Intelligence: Rhianon Allen and Arthur S. Reber. 24. Understanding Texts: Art Graesser and Pam Tipping. 25. Word Meaning: Barbara C. Malt. Part III: Methodologies of Cognitive Science:. 26. Artificial Intelligence: Ron Sun. 27. Behavioral Experimentation: Alexander Pollatsek and Keith Rayner. 28. Cognitive Ethology: Marc Bekoff. 29. Deficits and Pathologies: Christopher D. Frith. 30. Ethnomethodology: Barry Saferstein. 31. Functional Analysis: Brian Macwhinney. 32. Neuroimaging: Randy L. Buckner and Steven E. Petersen. 33. Protocal Analysis: K. Anders Ericsson. 34. Single Neuron Electrophysiology: B. E. Stein, M.T. Wallace, and T.R. Stanford. 35. Structural Analysis: Robert Frank. Part IV: Stances in Cognitive Science:. 36. Case-based Reasoning: David B. Leake. 37. Cognitive Linguistics: Michael Tomasello. 38. Connectionism, Artificial Life, and Dynamical Systems: Jeffrey L. Elman. 39. Embodied, Situated, and Distributed Cognition: Andy Clark. 40. Mediated Action: James V. Wertsch. 41. Neurobiological Modeling: P. Read Montague and Peter Dayan. 42. Production Systems: Christian D. Schunn and David Klahr. Part V: Controversies in Cognitive Science:. 43. The Binding Problem: Valerie Gray Hardcastle. 44. Heuristics and Satisficing: Robert C. Richardson. 45. Innate Knowledge: Barbara Landau. 46. Innateness and Emergentism: Elizabeth Bates, Jeffrey L. Elman, Mark H. Johnson, Annette Karmiloff-Smith, Domenico Parisi, and Kim Plunkett. 47. Intentionality: Gilbert Harman. 48. Levels of Explanation and Cognition Architectures: Robert N. McCauley. 49. Modularity: Irene Appelbaum. 50. Representation and Computation: Robert S. Stufflebeam. 51. Representations: Dorrit Billman. 52. Rules: Terence Horgan and John Tienson. 53. Stage Theories Refuted: Donald G. Mackay. Part VI: Cognitive Science in the Real World:. 54. Education: John T. Bruer. 55. Ethics: Mark L. Johnson. 56. Everyday Life Environments: Alex Kirlik. 57. Institutions and Economics: Douglass C. North. 58. Legal Reasoning: Edwina L. Rissland. 59. Mental Retardation: Norman W. Bray, Kevin D. Reilly, Lisa F. Huffman, Lisa A. Grupe, Mark F. Villa, Kathryn L. Fletcher, and Vivek Anumolu. 60. Science: William F. Brewer and Punyashloke Mishra. Selective Biographies of Major Contributors to Cognitive Science: William Bechtel and Tadeusz Zawidzki. (shrink)

VOLUME V REASON IN SCIENCE CHAPTER 1 179 TYPES AND AIMS OF SCIENCE CHAPTER II 204 HISTORY CHAPTER III 225 MECHANISM ...

George W. Roberts; III—Some Questions in Epistemology, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 June 1970, Pages 37–60, https://doi.org/10.

This new translation of The Science of Logic (also known as 'Greater Logic') includes the revised Book I (1832), Book II (1813), and Book III (1816). Recent research has given us a detailed picture of the process that led Hegel to his final conception of the System and of the place of the Logic within it. We now understand how and why Hegel distanced himself from Schelling, how radical this break with his early mentor was, and to what extent it (...) entailed a return (but with a difference) to Fichte and Kant. In the introduction to the volume, George di Giovanni presents in synoptic form the results of recent scholarship on the subject, and, while recognizing the fault lines in Hegel's System that allow opposite interpretations, argues that the Logic marks the end of classical metaphysics. The translation is accompanied by a full apparatus of historical and explanatory notes. (shrink)

What drives much of the current philosophical interest in the idea of group cognition is its appeal to the manifestation of psychological properties—understood broadly to include states, processes, and dispositions—that are in some important yet elusive sense emergent with respect to the minds of individual group members. Our goal in this paper is to address a set of related, conditional questions: If human mentality is real yet emergent in a modest metaphysical sense only, then: (i) What would it mean for (...) a group to have emergent cognitive states? (ii) Is this even a metaphysically coherent view? (iii) Relative to which notion of emergence do we have reason to believe that certain groups in fact have emergent cognitive states? We shall argue that evidence from a wide variety of social science domains makes it plausible that there are group cognitive states and processes no less metaphysically emergent than human cognitive (and other special science) states and processes. (shrink)

The Hegel Lectures SeriesSeries Editor: Peter C. Hodgson Hegel's interpretation of the history of philosophy not only played a central role in the shaping of his own thought, but also has had a great influence on the development of historical thinking. In his own view the study of the history of philosophy is the study of philosophy itself. This explains why such a large proportion of his lectures, from 1805 to 1831, the year of his death, were about history of (...) philosophy. The text of these lectures, presented here in the first authoritative English edition, is therefore a document of the greatest importance in the development of Western thought: they constitute the very first comprehensive history of philosophy that treats philosophy itself as undergoing genuine historical development. And they are crucial for understanding Hegel's own systematic works such as the Phenomenology, the Logic, and the Encyclopedia, for central to his thought is the theme of spirit as engaged in self-realization through the processes of historical change. Furthermore, they played a crucial role in one of the determining events of modern intellectual history: the rise of a new consciousness of human life, culture, and intellect as historical in nature. This third volume of the lectures covers the medieval and modern periods, and includes fascinating discussion of scholastic, Renaissance, and Reformation philosophy, and of such great modern thinkers as Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, and especially Kant. (shrink)

This text was first published as ‘De nova methodo naturam ac motum fluidi electrici investigandi’ in Novi Commentarrii Societatis Regiae Scientiarum Gottingensis. Commentationes physicae et mathematicae classis 8 (Göttingen 1778: 168–80). It also appeared in a printing by Joann Christian Dieterich in Göttingen in 1778. Lichtenberg delivered this talk personally to the Royal Society of Sciences in Göttingen on 21 February 1778. Although Lichtenberg was not present, he had already informed the Royal Society of Lichtenberg’s discovery of the electrical figures (...) at a meeting on 3 May 1777. The present German version was first published in Lichtenberg’s Vermischte Schriften, vol. 9 (Physikalische und mathematische Schriften, vol. 4) (Göttingen, 1806) pp. 49–80. Wolgang Promies suggests that the German translation was likely done by Friedrich Christian Kries, who was a co-editor of the Vermischte Schriften and Lichtenberg’s student (see Georg Christoph Lichtenberg [1974], Schriften und Briefe, [ed. Wolfgang Promies (K II: Kommentar zu Band III)], Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, p. 11). Lichtenberg was the first to propose the use of + and – to designate electricity in this article. (shrink)

Georges Bataille considered The Accursed Share, his radical critique of economic theories based on rational categories of need, scarcity, and utility, his most important project. In Volume I, he announced two further volumes, The History of Eroticism and Sovereignty, but he never published them in book form. This Zone edition includes in a single volume a reconstruction of completed versions of these texts as published in Bataille’s posthumous collected works. Here, Bataille expands on the notion developed in Volume I of (...) an economics based not on the management of scarce resources but on the exuberant consumption of excess production, the accursed share. In its first part, Bataille identifies eroticism as an ideal form of consumption, since in his view it is useless, purposeless. As this expenditure of excess energy demarcates the realm of human autonomy, the study of eroticism leads naturally to an examination of sovereignty, in which Bataille defines the sovereign individual as one who consumes and does not labor, creating a life beyond the realm of utility. (shrink)

Das Vorlesungsmanuskript zur "Naturphilosophie und Philosophie des Geistes" aus den Jahren 1805/06 stellt den spätesten der drei erhaltenen Systementwürfe aus der Jenaer Zeit Hegels dar. Hinsichtlich der Naturphilosophie zeichnet sich der Text dieser Vorlesung dadurch aus, daß er erstmals über eine systematische Gliederung verfügt, die der des Teils über die Philosophie der Natur in der Enzyklopädie von 1817 schon sehr nahekommt; hinsichtlich der Philosophie des Geistes dokumentiert der Text von 1805/06 die letzte Stufe der in den Jenaer Jahren vollzogenen Umformulierung (...) der Philosophie der Sittlichkeit zu einer Theorie des Bewußtseins. (shrink)

In his Aesthetics Hegel gives full expression to his seminal theory of art. He surveys the history of art from ancient India, Egypt, and Greece through to the Romantic movement of his own time, criticizes major works, and probes their meaning and significance; his rich array of examples gives broad scope for his judgement and makes vivid his exposition of his theory. The substantial Introduction is Hegel's best exposition of his general philosophy of art, and provides the ideal way into (...) his Aesthetics. In Part I he considers the general nature of art: he distinguishes art, as a spiritual experience, from religion and philosophy; he discusses the beauty of art and differentiates it from the beauty of nature; and he examines artistic genius and originality. Part II provides a sort of history of art, divded into three periods called Symbolic, Classical, and Romantic. Part III deals individually with architecture, scuplture, painting, music, and literature. (shrink)

In this response, George Ellis comments on the publications of part III. He responds first to Denis Noble, before outlining his thoughts on Larissa Albantakis’, Francesco Massari’s, Maggie Beheler-Amass’ and Giulio Tononi’s piece.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John Dewey in Chicago: Some BiographicalNotes* GEORGE DYKHUIZEN DEWEY'S REPUTATION in philosophical, psychological, and educational circles brought him many invitations to lecture at other institutions of higher learning, and he was frequently kept busy meeting these engagements. In July, 1896, for example, he headed the departments of psychology and pedagogy at the Summer Institute of Martha's Vineyard,1 and in August delivered a series of lectures on "Imagination in (...) Education" at Chatauqua. 2 During the summer of 1901, he gave courses at the University of California in Berkeley~ and in the spring of 1904 gave six lectures on "Problems of Knowledge" at Columbia University and three lectures on "Moral Education" at Brooklyn Institute3 Dewey was also very much in demand as a speaker at professional meetings of philosophers, psychologists, and educators. In the spring of 1896 he spoke at the first annual meeting of the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools.5 He was elected president of the American Psychological Association for the year 1899-1900 and gave as his presidential address, "Psychology and Social Practice." Later, in December, 1901, he addressed the Association on "Interpretation of Savage Mind." g Dewey was also an active member of the American Philosophical Association and was to become its president in 1905 He was a member of the Illinois Society for Child Study and of the National Herbart Society and frequently addressed meetings of these organizations. With so much of his spare time taken up with off-campus engagements, Dewey could not take as great a part in on-campus activities as he may have wished. Nevertheless, like other members of the faculty, he took his turn speaking at the Wednesday afternoon lecture series which the University provided for the students. The most outstanding of Dewey's talks on these occasions were the two he delivered on successive Wednesdays in the summer of 1897. These were entitled "Evolution and Ethics," and created quite a stir because in them Dewey defended evolution and attacked the dualism between the cosmic and ethical processes set up by T. H. Huxley in his Romanes lecture of 1893. Dewey argued that the ethical has its roots in the cosmic and is continuous with itY *This is the second of two articles on John Dewey'sChicago years. For the first of these articles, see my "John Dewey: The Chicago Years," Journal of the History o/ Philosophy, I1:2 (Oct., 1964),227-253. 1University Record, I (July, 1896),278. Ibid. (Aug.7, 1896),311. 81bid. VI (July 26, 1901),171. ~Ibid. IX (June, 1904),92. 51bid. I (April10, 1896),35. *Ibid. VI (March, 1902), 358. Dewey's talk appeared in Psychological Review, IX (May, 1902),217-230. Ibid. II (July, 1897),162.Dewey'stalks werepublished in the Monist, III (1898),321-341. [217] 218 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY There is no record of Dewey having spoken, as did many of the other faculty members, at the University Chapel services held, for a while, each noon on the campus. Indeed, during his Chicago years and thereafter, Dewey disassociated himself more and more from organized religion and instead devoted his energies to educational and social affairs. He did not join the Hyde Park Congregational Church upon surrendering his membership in the Congregational Church in Ann Arbor, and he did not require that his children do so. When his mother, a loyal and pious Congregationalist who was living with them, remonstrated and declared that the children ought to be sent to Sunday School, Dewey's reply was that in his youth he had gone to Sunday School enough to make up for his children's failure to do so. Dewey attended only irregularly the meetings of the University Senate, being present at only eleven of the nineteen meetings held during his years at Chicago. But he made his voice heard when he was present. He was one of two opposed to the establishment of a separate school of commerce and political science;s he moved to waive the requirement of Latin for graduation from the Senior College ;9 he proposed "a modification of the requirements respecting history in the undergraduate course"; 1~and he voted in favor of requiring one... (shrink)

Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472-1529) was one of China's most influential Ruist philosophers. The publication widely regarded as most representative of his Ruism is the three-volume Record of Instructions for Practice. Wang Yangming’s followers kept records of statements he made and conversations he held when discussing his Ruist learning with them. During and after his lifetime, these records were compiled in three volumes. The third volume was gathered together and edited by his ardent follower Qian Dehong 錢德洪, who then published it (...) in 1556. This book is a modern, bilingual Chinese-English edition of the third volume with annotations and commentary. (shrink)

Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472-1529) was one of China's most influential Ruist philosophers. The publication widely regarded as most representative of his Ruism is the three-volume Record of Instructions for Practice. Wang Yangming’s followers kept records of statements he made and conversations he held when discussing his Ruist learning with them. During and after his lifetime, these records were compiled in three volumes. The third volume was gathered together and edited by his ardent follower Qian Dehong 錢德洪, who then published it (...) in 1556. This book is a modern, bilingual Chinese-English edition of the third volume with annotations and commentary. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Lorsqu'il aborde les vérités de mathématiques dans la «I re Méditation», Descartes ne dit pas si la perception qu'il en a est claire et distincte ou non. Certains, dont H. G. Frankfurt, persuadés que Descartes tient pour impossible la révocation en doute du clair et distinct, estiment que cette perception est nécessairement obscure et confuse. S'appuyant sur divers textes, Frankfurt verrait d'ailleurs en lui à ce moment-là un empiriste naïf. Nous tentons ici l'hypothèse contraire en attribuant le silence de Descartes (...) aux contraintes que l'ordre des raisons impose au langage même dont il se sert: en effet, clarté et distinction sont pour Descartes des termes techniques dont il ne peut s'autoriser l'emploi qu'à partir de la «III e Méditation». Cette perception serait donc, selon nous, matériellement claire et distincte; elle serait néanmoins révoquée en doute, sans quoi la validation de la raison que tente Descartes ne saurait s'accomplir. (shrink)

La preuve ontologique fait plus qu'appuyer celles de la IIIe Méditation. Elle vise à répondre enfin à ceux « qui aimeront mieux nier l'existence d'un Dieu si puissant, que de croire que toutes les autres choses sont incertaines », donc à des mathématiciens athées, reprenant ainsi, pour l'éliminer, une des alternatives déployées à la Ie Méditation. Dieu, condition suffisante de la connaissance (Méditations III & IV), en devient la condition nécessaire aussi (Méditation V). Cette preuve permet donc à Descartes de (...) parer à la possibilité d'un rationalisme – cartésien certes – mais athée. Nous concluons en faisant le point sur le débat qui opposa MM. Gueroult et Gouhier, sur ce sujet, vers 1958. The ontological proof does more than corroborate those of Meditation III. It seeks to answer at last those « who would prefer to deny the existence of so powerful a God, rather than to believe that everything else is uncertain » (atheistic mathematicians), thus taking up again, in order to rule it out, one of the alternatives presented in Meditation I. God, the sufficient condition of knowledge (Meditations III & IV), now becomes its necessary condition as well (Meditation V). This proof thus enables Descartes to forestall the possibility of an atheistic, even though Cartesian, rationalism. We conclude with an assessment of the debate which opposed Messrs. Gueroult and Gouhier, on this topic, around 1958. (shrink)